Wed 3rd May: Kripke’s Unpublished Knowledge Argument

Title: Kripke’s Unpublished Knowledge Argument
 
Speaker: Adriana Renero 
 
When: Wed May 3rd, 2 – 4pm
 
Where: The Graduate Center, CUNY, Room 7113.08
 
Abstract: In his unpublished 1979 lectures on the philosophy of mind, Kripke offers another argument against the physicalist thesis that “one who knows all the physical truths—or all the physical facts—knows everything.” This argument appeals to the auditory domain. In this talk, I will discuss several cases of deaf people, which Kripke provides, and adapt these into one single case: the deaf person case. Then I will claim that this is a precursor of Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument against physicalism” i.e. the often-quoted “Mary case” (1982). In doing so, I will compare and contrast Kripke and Jackson’s cases, and argue that the deaf person case constitutes a more persuasive argument against physicalism. I will also show that Kripke offers an account of descriptions of the phenomenal character of auditory experiences and pinpoints important aspects of phenomenal character that Jackson does not address. 

Graham Priest to Give November 11 Guest Presentation in Kripke Course

At 2:00 on Wednesday, November 11, Professor Graham Priest (CUNY) will present on the revision of logic in “Topics In the Epistemology of Logic II”, co-taught by Professors Saul Kripke and Romina Padro, in room 8203 of the Graduate Center.

Course Description: This seminar is a continuation of the seminar that we gave in the Fall of 2014. Enough will be initially repeated so that attendance at the previous seminar will not be presupposed. We will begin with a review of the problem set up with Lewis Carroll in the paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” and similar arguments that can be given for other connectives. The point will be that logic cannot be taken as a set of postulates. However, this time we intend to discuss various strategies for justifying our usual logical rules and a number of distinguished philosophers have accepted our invitation to come and present their views on this and related matters to the seminar. Our initial list of guest speakers includes Paul Boghossian, Hartry Field, Christopher Peacocke, and our own Graham Priest.

Christopher Peacocke to Give December 2 Guest Presentation in Kripke Course

At 2:00 on Wednesday, December 2nd, Professor Christopher Peacocke (Columbia) will be a guest presenter in “Topics In the Epistemology of Logic II”, co-taught by Professors Saul Kripke and Romina Padro, in room C196.06 (concourse level), accessible through the library of the Graduate Center.

Course Description: This seminar is a continuation of the seminar that we gave in the Fall of 2014. Enough will be initially repeated so that attendance at the previous seminar will not be presupposed. We will begin with a review of the problem set up with Lewis Carroll in the paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” and similar arguments that can be given for other connectives. The point will be that logic cannot be taken as a set of postulates. However, this time we intend to discuss various strategies for justifying our usual logical rules and a number of distinguished philosophers have accepted our invitation to come and present their views on this and related matters to the seminar. Our initial list of guest speakers includes Paul Boghossian, Hartry Field, Christopher Peacocke, and our own Graham Priest.

New Saul Kripke Paper “Fregean Quantification Theory”

New Saul Kripke paper, “Fregean Quantification Theory,” to be published in Journal of Philosophical Logic. Now available to view at Online First (with login):

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10992-013-9299-x

Abstract: Frege’s system of first-order logic is presented in a contemporary framework. The system described is distinguished by economy of expression and an unusual syntax.

SKC Director Gary Ostertag reviews Kripke by John Burgess in NDPR

Saul Kripke Center Directory Gary Ostertag reviews Kripke by John Burgess in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

“John Burgess’s book is a gem: an accessible yet nuanced introduction to the work of one of our greatest living philosophers. While the book can serve as a selective introduction not only to Kripke’s thought, but also more generally to core topics in contemporary analytic philosophy, it also has much to offer seasoned Kripke scholars. The discussions of Kripke on modal epistemology, on Wittgenstein on rules, and on a posteriori necessities involving natural kinds — to mention just three topics — will be read with interest by anyone working in the relevant areas. More than that, the book is eminently readable, witty — in fact, downright funny in places — and both tells a compelling story about Kripke’s place in the history of philosophy and shows how central themes of his oeuvre interrelate.”

Review